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Abstract 
Advocates of complexity theory describe it as a new scientific paradigm.  Complexity 
theory identifies instability and disorder in politics and policymaking, and links it to the 
behaviour of complex systems.  It suggests that we shift our analysis from individual 
parts of a political system to the system as a whole; as a network of elements that interact 
and combine to produce systemic behaviour.  This article explores the use of complexity 
theory in public policy, highlighting a small literature using the language of complexity 
directly to describe complex policymaking systems, and a larger literature identifying 
complexity themes.  It then highlights the main problems to be overcome before 
complexity theory can become truly valuable in politics and policymaking.   
 
Introduction  
Advocates of complexity theory describe it as a new scientific paradigm (Mitchell, 2009: 
x).  They suggest that it can change the way we think about, and study, the natural and 
social world.  It marks a scientific revolution; a revolutionary break from the 
‘reductionist’ approach.  Complexity theory suggests that we shift our analysis from 
individual parts of a system to the system as a whole; as a network of elements that 
interact and combine to produce systemic behaviour that cannot be broken down merely 
into the actions of its constituent parts.  Rather, the aim is identify what types of systemic 
outputs occur when its members follow the same basic rules, and how sensitive the 
system is, or what small changes in rules will produce profound changes in systemic 
behaviour. The metaphor of a microscope or telescope, in which we zoom in to analyse 
individual components or zoom out to see the system as a whole, sums up this shift of 
approach.  Far reaching examples of emergent behaviour in the natural and social world -  
from bees swarming, to thoughts and feelings emerging from cells and neurons in the 
brain, and emerging forms of cooperation among social groups - also highlight its wide 
application.  Indeed, advocates of complexity theory highlight its strong appeal across the 
sciences as a whole and its unusual ability to foster a meaningful degree of 
interdisciplinarity.   
 
Complexity theory has been applied to the study of neuroscience, ecology, epidemiology, 
memory coding, computer science and metabolic networks (Newman et al, 2006; beim 
Graben et al, 2008; Motter et al, 2002; Arenas et al, 2008; Moura et al, 2003).  It has 
some strong support in the social sciences (including Byrne, 1998), has attracted special 
journal issues (including Public Management Review and Political Analysis - see 
Teisman and Klijn, 2008; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006), has been used to understand 
international relations (Jervis, 1998), public policy and policymaking institutions (Geyer 
and Rihani, 2010; Room, 2011) and has been used by think tanks, academics and 
practitioners to recommend new forms of policymaking (Hallsworth and Rutter, 2011; 
Room, 2011: 306-18; Sanderson, 2006; 2009; Geyer, 2012).  It is also used more widely 
in many areas of political science without necessarily being branded as ‘complexity’ 
work.  Consequently, it is a theory that should be taken very seriously in political science.   
 
The aim of this article is to provide a brief, broad overview of the topic; to assess the 
value of complexity theory in political science in general, but also focus on its links to 
policy theory and practice in particular.  First, it provides a definition of complexity 
theory and identifies its key tenets.  Second, it describes how complexity theory is 
applied in political science (explicitly and directly, or implicitly and indirectly).  Third, it 
highlights the challenges that we face when seeking to combine insights from the natural 
and social sciences into a theory that informs our understanding of political science (see 
also Cairney, 2010a).  Our main concern may be that the language of ‘complexity’ is 
used too loosely, without yet providing: a common definition to tie together a wide range 
of studies; a convincing way to adapt complexity theory to political science without 
presenting a deterministic argument; or, a way to use its insights to give meaningful 
advice to policymakers.  The article shows briefly how these concerns can be addressed.   
 
What is Complexity Theory? 
Complexity theory is generally sold as a new approach to science in which we identify 
(then explain) systems or processes that lack the order and stability required to produce 
universal rules about behaviour and outcomes.  When applied to the sciences as a whole, 
it is described as a revolutionary break from the ‘reductionist’ approach to science and 
the ‘paradigm of order’ (Mitchell, 2009: x; Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 12), or as a new 
‘way of thinking’ and ‘seeing the world’; as a ‘world of instability and fluctuations’ when 
in the past it was seen as ‘stable’ (Newton’s laws are often used as an example of the old 
way of thinking) (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003: 26; Sanderson, 2006: 117).   
 
In political science, it is mostly used to challenge particular brands of ‘positivism’ which 
present a ‘vision of society based on order, laws and progress’ (Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 
5); to suggest that ‘quantitative and reductionist methodologies’ may be useful to explain 
topics such as elections with ‘rules and orderly structures’, but not issues which contain 
unpredictable political events, significant levels of uncertainty and ambiguity (Geyer and 
Rihani, 2010: 74-5) or factors outside of the control of policymakers (Room, 2011: 6-7; 
see Klijn, 2008: 314 on ‘wicked’, or apparently intractable, policy problems).  Many 
accounts also use it to challenge their idea of rational choice theory (Little, 2008: 29-30; 
Lewis and Steinmo, 2008: 15-20; 2010: 237; Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 5).  Thus, it may 
be used increasingly to support the ‘backlash’ against this approach which (at least in the 
1990s) looked like it might become paradigmatic (Hindmoor, 2011: 191).  More broadly, 
it may mark a return of sorts to more ‘holistic’ and less ‘individualistic’ accounts of 
political behaviour.
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Its distinctiveness derives less from its identification of complexity in a broad sense and 
more from its focus on complex systems (in other words, it does not merely say that the 
world is complicated – Little, 2012: 6).   It seeks to explain why complex or system-wide 
behaviour emerges from the interaction between ‘large collections of simpler 
components’ (Mitchell, 2009: x; Kernick, 2006; Blackman, 2001).  There is considerable 
variation in the way that the theory is described and used (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003: 23; 
Geyer 2012: 31), but we can identify six main themes regarding how complex systems 
behave and how we should study them (see Cairney, 2012: 125-6):   
 
1. A complex system cannot be explained merely by breaking it down into its 
component parts because those parts are interdependent: elements interact with 
each other, share information and combine to produce systemic behaviour.   
2. The behaviour of complex systems is difficult (or impossible) to predict.  They 
exhibit ‘non-linear’ dynamics produced by feedback loops in which some forms 
of energy or action are dampened (negative feedback) while others are amplified 
(positive feedback).  Small actions can have large effects and large actions can 
have small effects.      
3. Complex systems are particularly sensitive to initial conditions which produce a 
long-term momentum or ‘path dependence’.   
4. They exhibit emergence, or behaviour that evolves from the interaction between 
elements at a local level rather than central direction.  This makes the system 
difficult to control (and focuses our attention on the rules of interaction and the 
extent to which they are adhered to).   
5. They may contain ‘strange attractors’ or demonstrate extended regularities of 
behaviour which are ‘liable to change radically’ (Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 39; 
Bovaird, 2008: 320).  They may therefore exhibit periods of ‘punctuated 
equilibria’ - in which long periods of stability are interrupted by short bursts of 
change.  
6. The various problems that complexity theory seeks to address – such as predicting 
climate change, earthquakes, the spread of disease among populations, the 
processing of DNA within the body, how the brain works, the growth of computer 
technology and artificial intelligence, and the behaviour of social and political 
systems – can only be solved by interdisciplinary scientific groups (Mitchell, 
2009: x).   
 
Complexity Theory and the Public Policy Literature 
The complexity and public policy literature consists of two main strands: (a) a relatively 
small strand that engages directly and explicitly with complexity theory when analysing 
public policy, arguing that policymaking systems are complex systems (in other words, 
complexity is often not used as just another natural science metaphor); and, (b) a much 
wider range of studies, central to the public policy literature, that highlight complex 
system characteristics without necessarily using the language of complexity.   
 
(A) Policymaking Systems are Complex Systems 
Complexity theory highlights the problems that arise when policymakers do not 
recognise the complex nature of their policy environments.  Geyer and Rihani (2010: 29) 
link the pursuit of ‘human order’ to a myriad of failed attempts to control the social 
world, from socialism in the Soviet Union to the pursuit of a free market ideology in the 
‘Third World’ and “the 1980s and 1990s emphasis on ‘centralised public management’”.  
They do not identify a complete lack of order or control in political systems.  Rather, they 
describe a ‘partial order’ in which there are both ‘orderly and chaotic behaviours’.  Some 
phenomena can be reduced to their constituent parts and modelled to aid prediction, while 
others may not, producing uncertainty and a reliance on probabilistic prediction.  They 
suggest that these elements have been ignored by policymakers in the UK who were too 
driven by the idea of order, as it related to government (by maintaining rigid hierarchies 
and producing top-down, centrally driven policy strategies) or to the dominant approach 
to policy, such as new public management reforms in which the application of private 
sector ideas to the public sector ‘required a radical increase in performance indicators so 
that the centre could oversee and direct what the local and decentralised actors were 
doing’ (2010: 23; Geyer, 2012: 21).  The outcome may be policy failure and demoralised 
policymakers (Room, 2011: 7). 
 
In this context, complexity theory may provide four key policymaking insights (Teisman 
and Klijn, 2008: 288; see also Cairney, 2012: 126; Blackman, 2001; Kernick, 2006; 
Sanderson, 2006; 2009).  The first is that law-like behaviour is difficult to identify 
because the policy process is ‘guided by a variety of forces’, suggesting that X will only 
have an effect on Y under particular conditions that are difficult to specify.   A policy that 
was successful in one context may not have the same effect in another.  We need to know 
why it was successful in that instance, but the idea of complexity is that so many 
variables are relevant (and tiny variations in them can matter) that it is difficult to account 
for them all.  The second is that systems appear to have ‘self-organizing capacities’, 
making them difficult to control; the effect of an internal or external force may be large 
or small and this is impossible to predict from the force alone.    This lesson could be 
learned by policymakers who otherwise would be surprised that their policy interventions 
did not have the desired effect.  The third relates to the metaphor of the ‘fitness 
landscape’ or ‘surroundings in which living beings exist and behave’.  This landscape, 
which provides the context for the choices of agents, is unstable and often changes 
rapidly.  Therefore, agents or organisations must adapt quickly and not rely on a single 
policy strategy (2008: 289; see also Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 35-6). The fourth is that actors 
within complex systems can create ‘their own perception of what they want and how to 
behave in the landscape they are in’ (2008: 289).  However, policymakers often seek to 
concentrate more power at the centre rather than seek to understand their policymaking 
environment.   
 
Overall, Teisman and Klijn (2008: 294) point to a way of understanding policymaking as 
a process that defies simple solutions.  For example, while top-down implementation 
models might link success to simplicity, to one clear goal and a select number of officials 
to carry it out, complexity theory suggests that this process could not be separated and 
made immune from its wider context.  Rather, implementing officials will have to adapt 
policy in response to this dynamic process (see also Bovaird, 2008: 339).  Mitleton-Kelly 
(2003: 41) places more emphasis on self-organisation and emergent behaviour as it 
relates to the whole system.  In this sense, we are not just talking about individuals 
adapting to their environments because ‘a system may need to be studied as a complete 
and interacting whole rather than as an assembly of distinct and separate elements’.  In 
other words, breaking the process down into a system’s constituent parts (including the 
actions of individuals within it) may undermine explanation.  We discuss such tensions of 
explanation, between the system and individuals, below.  
    
 (B) Complexity Themes in Public Policy
ii
 
The complexity literature has its own jargon to demonstrate that political systems exhibit 
the characteristics of complex systems.  Yet, it also has resonance with several theories in 
political science.  First, the link between complexity theory and discussions of path 
dependence is strong, and the focus on ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ is a key tenet of 
historical institutionalism (although we need to be very careful with such comparisons).
iii
  
Path dependence suggests that when a commitment to a policy has been established and 
resources devoted to it, over time it produces ‘increasing returns’ (when people adapt to, 
and build on, the initial decision) and it effectively becomes increasingly costly to choose 
a different path (Pierson, 2000; compare with Room, 2011: 7-8; 16-8).  In many cases 
these ‘returns’ are associated with the establishment and maintenance of institutions.  
Historical institutionalist studies often define institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure conflict’ (Hall in Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992: 2).   The focus of analysis becomes the details of a ‘critical juncture’ and 
the timing of decisions is crucial, because it may be the order of events that sets policy on 
a particular path.  We identify both inertia and unpredictability, as relatively small events 
or actions can have a huge and enduring effect on policy change which is very difficult to 
reverse.  Both, Pierson (2000: 253) and Room (2011: 16) adopt the same language (the 
‘Polya urn’) and examples (such as the QWERTY keyboard) to describe the 
unpredictability of events and initial choices followed by subsequent inflexibility when 
the rules governing systemic behaviour become established and difficult (but not 
impossible) to change.  
 
Second, a key type of punctuated equilibrium theory (as articulated by Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2005; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Workman et al, 2009) employs some 
of the language of complexity to explain a shift in group-government relationships, from 
the simple ‘clubby days’ of early post-war politics to ‘complex relationships’ at multiple 
levels of government and among a huge, politically active population (Heclo, 1978: 94; 
97; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 177-8; Jordan, 1981: 98; Richardson, 2000: 1008; see 
also Bovaird, 2008: 321 and Klijn’s 2008: 302 description of complex systems essentially 
as a series of subsystems, all of which have their own rules of behaviour and external 
forces to deal with).   The ‘general punctuation hypothesis’ demonstrates, in a study of 
information processing, that policy processes exhibit non-linear dynamics and punctuated 
equilibria.
iv
    Jones and Baumgartner (2005: 7) define information processing as the 
‘collecting, assembling, interpreting and prioritizing [of] signals from the environment’.  
Policymakers are effectively surrounded by an infinite number of ‘signals’, or 
information that could be relevant to their decisions (from, for example, interest groups, 
the media or public opinion).  Since they are ‘boundedly rational’ (Simon, 1976) and do 
not have the ability to process all signals, they must simplify their decision-making 
environment by ignoring most (negative feedback) and promoting few to the top of their 
agenda (positive feedback).   
 
Negative feedback may produce long periods of equilibrium since existing policy 
relationships and responsibilities are more likely to remain stable and policy is less likely 
to change when the issue receives minimal attention from policymakers.  Positive 
feedback may produce policy ‘punctuations’ because when policymakers pay a 
disproportionate amount of attention to an issue it is more likely that policy will change 
dramatically. This is particularly the case following a ‘bandwagon effect’ in which 
policymakers and interest groups at multiple levels of government all pay attention to an 
issue at the same time, often seeking to contribute to finding new ways to address old 
problems and challenge the right of one organisation to command policy responsibility.  
The ‘selective attention’ of decision-makers or institutions explains why issues can be 
relatively high on certain agendas, but not acted upon; why these powerful signals are 
often ignored and policies remain stable for long periods.  Policymakers are unwilling to 
focus on certain issues, either because ideology precludes action in some areas, there is 
an established view within government about how to address the issue, or because the 
process of acting ‘rationally’ (making explicit trade-offs between a wide range of 
decisions) is often unpopular.   They are also unable to give issues significant attention, 
because the focus on one issue means ignoring 99 others. Change therefore often requires 
a critical mass of attention to overcome the conservatism of decision-makers and shift 
their attention from competing problems (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 19-20; 48-51).  
If the levels of external pressure reach this tipping point, they cause major and infrequent 
punctuations rather than smaller and more regular policy changes: the burst in attention 
and communication becomes self-reinforcing; new approaches are considered, different 
‘weights’ are applied to the same categories of information; policy is driven ideologically 
by new actors; and/ or the ‘new’ issue sparks off new conflicts between political actors 
(2005: 52; 69).  Information processing is characterised by ‘stasis interrupted by bursts of 
innovation’ and policy responses are unpredictable and episodic rather than continuous 
(2005: 20). 
 
Third, complexity theory’s focus on emergent behaviour in the absence of central control 
evokes the literatures on implementation and governance which explore the problems that 
central governments face when they do not recognise the extent to which policy changes 
as it is implemented (Cairney, 2009; Butler and Allen, 2008; Klijn, 2008; compare with 
Marsh, 2008).   The level of interdependence governments share with implementing 
organisations has prompted the identification of ‘self-organizing networks’ (Rhodes, 
1997: 50) and images of ‘bottom-up’ implementation through self-selecting clusters of 
organizations in which a variety of public and private organizations cooperate (Barret and 
Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1981).  While there is some scope for central 
governments to control implementation, most notably through cross-cutting targets linked 
to the control of public expenditure (Richards and Smith, 2004), Lipsky’s (1980) classic 
analysis of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ suggests that, since public sector professions are 
subject to an immense range of (often unclear) requirements laid down by regulations at 
the top, they are powerless to implement them all successfully.    Instead, they establish 
routines and use rules of thumb to satisfy a proportion of central government objectives 
while preserving a sense of professional autonomy necessary to maintain morale.  While 
such problems have prompted governments in the past to embrace new public 
management (or the application of private business management methods to the public 
sector) and seek to impose order through hierarchy and targetry, such implementing 
structures may not be amenable to such direct control.   
 
 Complexity Theory: Problems and Solutions 
 
What Exactly is Complexity Theory? 
The first difficulty with complexity theory is that it is difficult to pin down when we 
move from conceptual to empirical analysis.  While we may find similar discussions in a 
wide range of texts in the literature, many accounts (such as Room, 2011: 327 fn. 2.1; 
Geyer, 2012: 31) still highlight terminological and conceptual variation, and often link it 
to the novelty of complexity theory. Its appeal in the sciences may be because it means 
different things to different people, suggesting that initial enthusiasm and cross-
disciplinary cooperation (when focused on broad concepts) may be replaced by growing 
dissatisfaction, scepticism and uncertainty about a core subject of common study (when 
focused on applying those concepts).   
 
This may be a particular problem in the social sciences because human behaviour, or ‘the 
capacity to reflect and to make deliberative choices and decisions among alternative paths 
of action’, makes the social world a different object of study than the physical world 
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 25-6; see also Padgett and McLean, 2006: 1464 - ‘imitation of 
biological science by the social sciences should never be slavish: social systems have no 
genes, and social systems have consciousness’).  Consequently, its application to public 
policy is often unclear and the term ‘complexity’ (like the term ‘evolution’) is often used 
very loosely or denotes a metaphor or analogy (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 26; Kernick, 2006: 
389; Bovaird, 2008: 321).  When we try to use the term more directly, to identify a real, 
complex political system we find less agreement about what a complex system is.  Jervis 
(1998: 5-6) prefers to define by example - ‘I know it when I see it’.  However, different 
people are clearly seeing different things, identifying complex systems from studies of 
local social housing projects (Shine, 2006) to large international systems (Jervis, 1998).  
Indeed, we face the need to examine how smaller systems operate within larger complex 
systems (Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 53 call this the ‘cascade of complexity’), which 
undermines the neat telescopic analogy.   
 
This is not an unusual problem, since most terms in the social science literature often 
defy common definition, while many vague terms such as ‘new institutionalism’ are used 
to represent a common focus (Cairney, 2012: 70).  In such cases, our aim is to identify a 
shared and distinctive scientific endeavour.  This may require the development of close-
knit interdisciplinary teams consisting of members of the natural and social sciences, 
which meet regularly to think through the details of theory development, as a way to 
overcome conceptual and methodological differences.  There may be great value in 
applying natural science ideas to the social sciences (and vice versa), but this requires us 
to go beyond using complexity as a metaphor and considering what processes such as 
‘emergence’ look like in practice. 
 
Deterministic Arguments? 
The second is that complexity theory often appears to present a deterministic argument.  
The potential danger is that if the complex system is predominantly the causal factor then 
we lose sight of the role that policymakers play; there may be a tendency to treat the 
system as a rule-bound structure which leaves minimal room for the role of agency.  This 
is a common concern regarding systems research - they often seem to have their own 
logics which ‘operate in some sense independent of – and over the heads of – the actors 
themselves’ (Hay, 2002: 102).  It would be tempting (but misleading) to contrast this 
picture with interpretive social science which rejects the assumption of structural 
constraint.  Interpretive accounts explore how agents perceive their decision-making 
environments; how they reproduce, accept or challenge the structural, institutional and 
wider systemic constraints that they appear to face when making decisions.  Indeed, they 
may even reject terms such as ‘institution’ and ‘rule’ because they imply a sense of 
permanence or common understanding that has not been demonstrated (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2003; 2006).   
 
A more positive treatment of complexity suggests that it gives us two perspectives that 
represent Giddens’ ‘two sides of the same coin … If we look at social practices in one 
way, we can see actors and actions; if we look at them another way we can see structures’ 
(Craib, 1992: 3 on Giddens, 1984).  On one side, we have ‘self-organizing landscapes’ 
(Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 289) or complex systems that adapt and change behaviour; 
behaviour is ‘emergent’ from the processes or interactions within systems and is not 
readily broken down to the agents within it (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 28).  On the other, we 
have the ‘self-referential behaviour’ of agents, reacting to ‘external forces and changes’ 
but also, ‘creating their own perception of what they want and how to behave in the 
landscape they are in’ (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 289; see also Haynes, 2008: 402)v.  
Consequently, there is scope to explore interpretive accounts of complexity if our aim is 
to understand how agents interpret, adapt to and influence their decision-making 
environment.  In-depth qualitative studies of practitioners, combining significant periods 
of observation with multiple interviews, may be usefully combined with mathematical 
modelling (Cairney, 2010b).  Such accounts would recognise the importance of agency 
and meaning, but also identify the limits to agency, when the actions of others - and 
factors beyond their control - limit their ability to act in particular ways.  They would also 
stress the importance of examining patterns which emerge from the interactions between 
large numbers of people and institutions (and are difficult to reduce simply to the role of 
individuals).   
 
What Does Complexity Mean to Policymakers? 
There have been notable attempts by academics and think tanks to translate complexity 
theory insights into meaningful lessons for policy practitioners, producing three main 
issues.  First, we can generally detect a normative side which often rejects the 
appropriateness of top-down control (in a way reminiscent of ‘bottom up’ approaches to 
implementation – Cairney, 2012: 37-8).  For example, Geyer and Rihani (2010: 7; 32-4) 
recommend that ‘soft management methods ... replace the outwardly forceful but 
practically blunt traditional hierarchical hard management methods’.  This may involve 
giving implementing organisations more freedom to learn from their experience and 
adapt to their environment (2009: 708; Haynes, 2008: 326).  Second, we can identify 
proposals to address the inevitability that policies will produce unintended consequences 
(and be subject to the unintended consequences of action elsewhere). Sanderson (2009: 
706) suggests that the implication of complexity is that we do not know exactly how any 
policy measure will make a difference.  Therefore, policymakers should be careful when 
making an intervention.  This suggests a greater use of “‘trial and error’ policy making” 
and learning from pilot projects (2009: 707; compare with Lindblom, 1959: 86 on 
incrementalism; see also Sanderson, 2006: 118: ‘knowledge of a system’s behaviour in 
the past will provide little guide to likely future behaviour’).  Little (2012: 16) suggests 
that we go further, to accept the inevitability of a degree of ‘error’ when we design 
policies, so that we can encourage ways to adapt quickly (rather than merely use the 
language of ‘failure’ in retrospect to justify abandoning a policy).  Geyer (2012: 32) 
suggests that we go further still, by fundamentally challenging the way that the UK 
Government has tried to measure and control policy outcomes, and promoting 
alternatives (such as the ‘complexity cascade’). 
 
Third, that translation process is not yet complete.  Its recommendations may be too 
abstract (encourage systemic emergence; encourage co-evolution with the social 
ecosystem; shift from strategic planning to strategic management), while even the more 
specific points (support the production of new ideas and ways of working in complex 
systems; encourage ‘subsystems’ within organisations to communicate with each other; 
give delivery organisations the freedom to manage) may seem meaningless or banal to 
public managers.  Room (2011) makes the most notable academic attempt to provide a 
new ‘toolkit’ for ‘agile’ policymakers, arguing that existing approaches are based on a 
too-simple understanding of the policy environment.  Yet, the instructions are often 
vague, including ‘map the landscape’ (‘is it stable or turbulent’?) and ‘model the 
struggle’ (’what would drive the race in a different direction’).  The Institute for 
Government (Hallsworth and Rutter, 2011: 18) recommendations appear more grounded 
in their regular discussions with practitioners, arguing for example that ‘greater 
awareness of complexity will encourage more informal, inquiring attempts to understand 
how the policy is being realised – rather than simple performance monitoring’.  This 
suggests that the best hope for complexity research is to develop such ‘toolkits’ in 
cooperation with policymakers, since that interaction can produce new ideas and ways of 
thinking.  As Hallsworth and Rutter (2011: 30) recommend: ‘the development of policy 
skills .. needs to be embedded into practice .. [governments need] to ensure that there are 
continual efforts to develop analytic skills so policy makers can be competent consumers 
of research, or are able to conduct an organisational analysis, or understand concepts 
from complexity science like emergence and feedback loops’. 
 
Conclusion: The End or the Beginning for Complexity Theory? 
Complexity theory has the potential to divide a political science audience.  For some, it 
represents a profoundly new way to examine politics; a paradigm shift in the social 
sciences that will help replace rational choice theory and shift our focus of explanation 
from individualistic to holistic accounts.  Indeed, the review process for this article was 
particularly interesting, since it demonstrated the strength of feeling among some scholars 
who suggest that it: represents an idiosyncratic and superficial review of a huge, well 
established field; makes numerous glaring errors of omission (regarding, for example, 
Luhmann, Axelrod, Page, Prigogine and the Santa Fe and Brussels schools); and, fails to 
show the value of complexity theory to concrete empirical work.  There is also much 
unresolved tension within the complexity field about how coherent the field is (should we 
talk rather about many complexity theories?) and the extent to which it has been used 
properly in political science (how can we compare the ‘hard sciences’, advancing 
important mathematical models, with the ‘soft sciences’ using metaphors in fields such as 
public management?).   
 
For others, it will be seen as a passing fad.  An unsympathetic reader may conclude that 
complexity theory has little to add to political science, since most of its themes may 
already be well established in the literatures on institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium, 
incrementalism and implementation.  Complexity theory may complicate the study of 
public policy without offering something new or its insights may be described as 
“obvious and ‘commonsensical’” (Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 186).  Indeed, it may 
compound the tendency towards providing ‘new’ concepts which produce a lack of 
clarity regarding their link to old concepts and the extent to which we are describing new 
phenomena as well as new ideas (Keating, 2009: 301).  Yet, when used wisely, we can 
identify two types of ‘added value’. 
 
The first source of potential value is academic.  The main advantage of this approach is 
that it helps us to take the links between the social and natural sciences more seriously 
(Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 186).  Past debates on subjects such as behaviouralism and 
rational choice theory perhaps centred (often in a rather confusing way) on the argument 
that it is inappropriate to slavishly import methods from the natural sciences.  With 
complexity theory there is scope for a more meaningful conversation between the 
sciences rather than the importation of methods and metaphors from the natural to the 
social, particularly since the social world often provides more fertile ground for 
complexity research.  Indeed, the trend in the physical sciences appears to be to look to 
the social sciences for the next big breakthrough in theory.  Complexity theory applied 
from the natural to the social sciences may aid our understanding of the policy process 
but also yield insights into our overall understanding of complex systems (Cairney, 
2010b). 
 
The second source of potential regards ‘impact’.  Complexity theory appears more likely 
to be used to produce practical advice to practitioners than to inform the wider 
theological debates on structure and agency that we find in political science.   Further, as 
Room (2011: 306) suggests, complexity may compete well (for example, within 
government training courses) with ‘policy cycle’ models based on the division of tasks 
into discrete stages (see Cairney, 2012: 32-4).  In this context, the restatement of themes 
that are already in good political science currency is less problematic.  These points are 
perhaps being restated because the lessons from ‘bottom-up’ studies have been lost or 
ignored, and governments continue to operate in a top-down manner rather than engaging 
in a more meaningful dialogue between those who design and those who deliver and use 
public services (Butler and Allan, 2008; Kernick, 2006: 388).  The academic world is 
well placed to foster that conversation.   
 
Yet, there is still some way to go.  The longer term value of complexity depends on our 
ability to make theoretical and practical progress by fostering interdisciplinary research, 
‘unpacking’ the term ‘complexity’ further and providing insights using a language 
common to academics and practitioners.  To state that political systems are complex is to 
state the obvious (although to state that they are ‘complex systems’ is not).  The real 
value of complexity theory may only come from meaningful applications which help 
solve real policy problems.   
 
Acknowledgements: to Robert Geyer, Stuart Astill, Graham Room and the three 
anonymous reviewers for comments on previous drafts.   
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i
 However, we should be careful not to turn rational choice into another straw man.  There are two points of 
comparison between rational choice and complexity that deserve further analysis.  First, the methodological 
individualism often used in RCT suggests that outcomes can be reduced to the level of the individual, but 
not all accounts do so.   Further, we should clarify what we mean when we refer to individual analysis.  In 
sophisticated rational choice accounts, individuals do not operate in a vacuum.  Instead, they operate within 
a structured environment, recognising rules and reacting/ adapting to the behaviour of other individuals.  As 
stated, this is not the polar opposite to complexity theory’s focus on interdependent elements which interact 
with each other, share information and combine to produce systemic behaviour – even if complexity theory 
suggests that we cannot break such analysis down to the individual.  The semantics of such arguments need 
further analysis.  Second, RCT and complexity can both be linked to the pursuit of evolutionary theory 
(albeit partly because this is an approach, like new institutionalism, with many variants).  For example, 
Lewis and Steinmo (2008) use evolutionary arguments to largely reject RCT, but they also acknowledge 
(with reference to Axelrod, 1984) the value of evolutionary game theory and the centrality of the trial-and-
error strategies of individuals to accounts of generational change in political science.  
ii
 See also Klijn (2008) for a link to the literature on governance, multiple streams analysis and game 
theory. 
                                                                                                                                                 
iii
 For example, many of these terms may be used in areas such as computing science or systems biology to 
explore unpredictability, while path dependence and sensitivity to initial conditions in historical 
institutionalism may often be more about explaining stability.   
iv
 Frank Baumgartner is also developing work which explores ‘power laws’ more directly.  See for example 
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/papers/Budgets_as_Power_Laws_2009.pdf and 
http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/Baumgartner-Power-Law-of-Death-gtown.pdf  
v
 See also Haynes (2008: 402): ‘Complexity accepts the inevitability that individuals are often subservient 
to social structures, but realizes that feedback from individuals, however, small in power, can contribute in 
unpredictable ways to the future organization and representation of structures’.  
